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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE ADHESION CONTRACT OF INSURANCE
Adhesion contracts are acknowledged in both civil and common
law jurisdictions but the consonance of effect is questionable. A
California court defines them as:
[A] standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the
party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing
party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject ...
Such an agreement does not issue from that freedom in bargaining
and equality of bargaining which are the theoretical parents of the
American law of contracts.'
It is the lack of equality in bargaining power that distinguishes
adhesion contracts from the traditional agreement.' While the term
has not yet found general recognition in our legal vocabulary, its
introduction into American jurisprudence3 in 1919 was followed by
favorable reaction from commentators and an increasing use by the
courts. By other reasoning, the common law judges have adopted
some of the effects of adhesion contract doctrine, particularly in the
field of insurance. Unfortunately the position of the California
courts is not clear.
ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT
In France during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
natural law theory and church teaching imposed upon the Roman
causa civilis an additional causa based on intent to gratuitously bene-
fit another. This religious influence on enforcement of promises is
also present in the Hindu system in which a man is bound in law to
the extent he is bound in religion. Extrinsic to this moral basis of
enforceability was the development of the common law of Contract
based to a large extent on procedure and the almost magical quality
of Forms. International trade aided the intermixing of these two
bases of enforceability and each acquired some of the aspects of the
other. The civil law countries, while recognizing that some promises
were unenforceable, held that promises intending a legal transaction
1 Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781,
784 (1961).
2 See Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contract, 35 TEmp. L.Q. 125
(1962).
8 Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. REV. 198, 222
(1919) dting the use of the term in foreign Jurisprudence. E.g., 2 PLANIOL, TAxrr*,
ELkMENTAIRE Du DRoIT CIVIL, § 972, 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 532,
533.
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would be enforced. Under the common law, as modified by natural
law concepts, the theory of equivalents provided the basis of enforce-
ability. Consideration was generally separate from the Form, but
the sealed instrument was still valuable for its form alone and this
was enough to support enforcement. Through a period of great
industrial expansion and emphasis on freedom, the reverence of
form in contract remained in the common law system. Even today,
resistance to change, a lingering fear of magisterial caprice, and a
lack of a definition of nudum pactum result in the court's reworking
the old forms by restatement, reinterpretation, and reconstruction.
Agreements between parties which are legally enforceable are said
to be like private legislation, and the courts can no more change
the terms of this "legislation" than they can the enactments of
elected bodies. This idea was put in the Constitution of the United
States4 but has been disappearing all over the rest of the world.
The civil law countries, on the other hand, have developed
two significant views which are the foundation of the true ad-
hesion contract. In France, by what Josserand5 calls "contractual
dirigism," the state makes the contract for the people. The judges
have the power to suspend, rescind, or even change the conditions
of the contract. The parties no longer make "private law." Planiole
notes that if the state undertakes to direct the economy itself, it
cannot admit the maintenance of contractual relations contrary
to those it envisages. A second concept is the humanitarian idea7
of protecting debtors by lifting or shifting burdens or losses, and
hence the burden of promises, so as to put them upon those "better
able to bear them." Friedmann' contends that the lack of equality
between contracting parties, and the necessity of standardization
in a complex society, requires the state to prescribe rather than
merely enforce contracts. Compared with this social control view,
the common law does not try to anticipate the terms of an infinite
number of varied transactions which is the typical condition in an
expanding, free enterprise system. By our traditional thinking, the
courts only interpret contracts, not make them for the parties; a
person is supposed to know the contract he makes.' Where a con-
tract is the result of bargaining within the play of the'market, "there
4 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
5 2 JOSSERAND, COURS DU DROIT CIVIL POSTiF FRANCAIS §§ 402-405 (3d ed. 1939).
6 2 PLANIO, TRArrA ELPMENTAIRE Du DRorr Ci=i §§ 443-480 (revised by
Ripert & Boulanger) (4th ed. 1952).
7 The homestead exemptions and bankruptcy discharges provide examples of
this concept in common law.
8 FRIEDMANN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN (1951).
9 VANCE, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1951). ". . . [Ulpon accepting it (the insurance
policy) the insured is conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, to have given
his assent to all of its terms." At 241.
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is no danger that freedom of contract will be a threat to the social
order as a whole."'" But the development of large scale enterprise
with mass production and mass distribution made a new type of
contract inevitable-the standardized mass contract."
The insurance industry was the first to acknowledge the hazard
of "judicial risk," 2 and in an effort to minimize this effect, utilized
standardized contracts which had been interpreted in the courts and
tested in the market place. Uniform provisions, actuarial tabula-
tions, and consistent court interpretations are important facts in
the creation of stable and more exact premium rates. But accom-
panying the benefits of mass merchandising with standardized con-
tracts, there was a decline in the relative bargaining power of the
insurance buyer. When the same provisions were universally used
by all competitors, the weaker party to the agreements had little or
no choice but to accept or reject in total. The effect of this type
of contract has been likened to statutes which are unilaterally im-
posed. The adhesion contract amounts to government by private
law of business enterprise over a mass of individuals.18 The courts
recognized the problems created by standardization and, while try-
ing to keep the elementary rules of contract law intact, have re-
sorted to interpretation of "ambiguities" to serve the ends of jus-
tice. 4 Insurance policy terms clearly labeled warranties would be
interpreted as representations, which would be followed by even
stricter policy language, in turn followed by other interpretations.
In some cases the evil of harsh warranties has only been corrected
by statute.' The doctrine of Adhesion Contract may provide for
a more orderly resolution of the conflict between freedom of con-
tract and the social harm inherent in inequality of bargaining power.
One of the earliest uses of this new term was in Bekken v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S.'" where the issue was the effec-
tiveness of coverage twenty five days after a life insurance applica-
10 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 CoLuTm. L. REv. 629, 630 (1943).
11 Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939).
12 The danger that the court or jury may be swayed by "irrational factors"
to decide against a powerful defendant.
Is Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704 (1931). However, the feeling of security which a standard contract imparts to
the weaker party may be more desirable than the suspicions and fears generated
when negotiating with a professional.
14 VANCE, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1951). "To hold the insured strictly to terms in
the choosing of which he bad no part, and the meaning of which he often cannot
understand, would often work gross injustice which the courts are loath to
inflict." At 243.
15 CAL. INS. CODE § 10113. ". .. (AII statements purporting to be made by
the insured shall, in the absence of fraud, be representations and not warranties."
16 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200 (1940).
[Vol. 5
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tion was taken but before the company had acted either to accept
or to reject the application and return the pre-paid premium.17 The
court stated:
It has been said that "life insurance contracts are contracts of
'adhesion.' The contract is drawn up by the insurer and the insured,
who merely 'adheres' to it, has little choice as to its terms." [citations
omitted] He has little or nothing to say as to the terms of the offer
which he will submit in his application or the contract which eventually
will be made.' 8
In the dissent in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star,'9 Justice Frank
called a passenger ticket a contract of adhesion, or a "take-it-or-
leave-it" contract.20 "In such a standardized or mass-production
agreement, with one-sided control of its terms, when the one party
has no real bargaining power, the usual contract rules, based on the
idea of 'freedom of contract,' cannot be applied rationally."'" While
stating that insurance contracts are outstanding examples, he indi-
cated there are many others. ". .. [T] he courts will do justice better
by forthrightly, not obliquely, articulating important doctrines of
public policy." 2 Although the term Adhesion Contract was not used,
the concept was clearly formulated in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,28 which was essentially a tort action involving breach
of warranty of merchantability.
Although the courts, with few exceptions, have been most sensitive
to problems presented by contracts resulting from gross disparity
in buyer-seller bargaining positions, they have not articulated a general
principle condemning, as opposed to public policy, the imposition on
the buyer of a skeleton warranty as a means of limiting the responsi-
bility of the manufacturer.24
And in a clear recognition of the changing social demands:
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who
are brought together by the play of the market, and who meet each
17 There was a conflict in evidence as to whether the deceased was an insurable
risk, the company maintaining that information was received indicating a moderately
serious drinking habit. In the opinion, the court examines at great length the various
holdings recognizing that the business of insurance is quasi-public in character and
indicates the various areas of control exercised by the state over the insurance carriers.
18 Bekken v. Equitable Life Soc. of U.S., 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200, 212 (1940).
19 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955). In this case the subject of the action was a
suit for damages for injuries sustained on the high seas by the deceased wife of
the plaintiff when she was a passenger on a ship owned by the defendant. The ticket
for the passage contained several contractual terms, one of which was that any
suit or action against the company must be commenced within one year after the
termination of the voyage notwithstanding any provisions of law of any country
or state to the contrary. The suit was not in fact brought within such a time.
20 Id. at 204.
21 Ibid.
22 Id. at 205.
23 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
24 Id. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 87 (1960).
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other on a footing of approximate economic equality. In such a society
there is no danger that freedom of contract will be a threat to the
social order as a whole. But in present-day commercial life the stand-
ardized mass contract has appeared. . . . Such standardized contracts
have been described as those in which one predominant party will
dictate its law to an undetermined multiple rather than to an
individual.25
THE APPLICATION OF ADHESION THEORY IN CALIFORNIA
The California insurance decisions have reflected the con-
flict between the strict view of the older common law, and the
more liberal view based on equity and public policy. As early as
1910, the philosophy of Adhesion Contract was announced: 26
[ . . T]he rule (referring to the presumption of knowledge of terms
in a written contract) should not be strictly applied to insurance
policies. It is a matter almost of common knowledge that a very
small percentage of policy-holders are actually cognizant of the pro-
visions of their policies and many of them are ignorant of the names
of the companies issuing the said policies. The policies are prepared
by the experts of the companies, they are highly technical in their
phraseology, they are complicated and voluminous ... and in their nu-
merous conditions and stipulations furnishing what sometimes may be
veritable traps for the unwary. . . . "The courts, while zealous to up-
hold legal contracts, should not sacrifice the spirit to the letter nor
should they be slow to aid the confiding and innocent .... -27
Later decisions, announcing what Vance28 cites as the growing
view, apply the strict rule that a bargain in writing raises a con-
clusive presumption (in the absence of fraud or mistake) of know-
ledge of the terms and brings binding force to the provisions. 29
While both positions continue to be held, it would now seem that
the more liberal view is gaining favor.
The most consistent pattern emerging from the decisions is
the importance of determining ambiguity (or lack of it) in the in-
surance contract. The strict view is that where provisions are
definite and certain there is no room for interpretation and the
courts will not indulge in a forced construction in order to cast a
25 Id. 161 A.2d at 86. Cf. Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465. "A
contract of the type in this case is not formulated as a result of the give-and-take
of bargaining where the desires of one party are balanced by those of the other."
At 467.
28 Raulet v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 107 Pac. 292 (1910).
27 Id. at 230, 107 Pac. at 298.
28 VANCE, I suRAxcE 259 (3d ed. 1951).
29 Madsen v. Maryland Casualty Co., 168 Cal. 204, 142 Pac. 51 (1914); Porter
v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur., Corp., 30 Cal. App. 198, 157 Pac. 825 (1916);
Layton v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 55 Cal. App. 202, 202 Pac. 958 (1921); Telford v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 2d 103, 69 P.2d 835 (1937).
[Vol. 5
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liability upon an insurer which is not assumed." The principle is
that the parties may contract as they please so long as they do not
violate law or public policy."' The more liberal view appears to rely
on ambiguity to justify sweeping alterations of the contracts. In
a "moderate" case32 the insurer denied liability for a fire loss to the
plaintiff's home which occurred on the thirteenth day of his absence
on vacation. The standard form 8 policy excluded liability after un-
occupancy for ten days. The court stated that the effect of the ex-
clusion clause was to shift the risk back onto the insured and after
rejecting the company's definition of "unoccupied," found the com-
pany liable. The finding of ambiguity concerning the term "unoc-
cupied" seemed to be necessary to the decision.
The first use of the term Adhesion Contract was in Neal v.
State Farm Ins. Co.3 4 where a contract of employment between the
company and one of its agents was called a contract of adhesion.35
"Here the party of superior bargaining power not only prescribes
the words of the instrument but the party who subscribes to it lacks
the economic strength to change such language."36 The court found
that there was no ambiguity in the contract so that the rules ap-
plicable to adhesion contracts would not come into play. This de-
cision seems to hold that ambiguity is necessary to enable the opera-
tive doctrines of adhesion contracts to attach. Attention should
again be called to the reasoning in the French civil law from which
the term came. An Adhesion Contract is a type of contract where
lack of freedom and equality in bargaining raises sufficient justifica-
tion for the courts to modify its effect.
Nearly two years later Justice Tobriner (who wrote the Neal
decision) again announced the doctrine in Steven v. Fidelity and
Casualty Co. of New York.3 7 This case involved a purchase of a
"trip accident policy" from a vending machine. The insured was
killed during the course of the trip and the company denied liability
30 National Automobile Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 11 Cal. 2d 689, 691,
81 P.2d 926, 927 (1938). Accord, McMilan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 211 Cal. App.
2d 58, 27 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1962), (courts are not to put strained construction on
policy in order to create ambiguity); General Casualty Co. of America v. Azteca
Film, Inc., 278 F.2d 161 (1960), (reaching a strained interpretation of a contract
is tantamount to rewriting it, which the courts cannot do).
81 CAL. Is. Con- § 381; Linnastruth v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident
Ass'n., 22 Cal. 2d 216, 137 P.2d 833 (1943).
32 Foley v. Sonoma Ins. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 232, 115 P. 2d 1 (1941).
33 This type of policy is a statutory creation from which the companies cannot
deviate. If it is construed as ambiguous, the companies are caught between the
legislature on one hand and the courts on the other.
84 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1961).
85 Id. at 692, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
36 Id. at 695, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
87 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1962).
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relying on terms in the exclusion clause.8" The court found ambi-
guity, interpreted the contract strictly against the company, and
found liability. The ambiguity was not so much in the meaning of
the terms used, but in the failure to clearly indicate all areas of non-
coverage. Since an insurance policy may be written to cover a
variety of risks, this reasoning would make it extremely difficult
for any insurance company to define the actual risk undertaken. 9
The court then considered the policy as an adhesion contract and
supported the decision on this theory. ". . . [C]ases have held that
in such contracts the expected coverage of the policy can only be
defeated by a provision for limitation which has been plainly
brought to the attention of the insured.1 40 "If it (the company)
deals with the public on a mass basis, the notice of non-coverage of
the policy ... must be conspicuous, plain, and clear."'" The court
made the following statement, which on its face seems to impose
a limit on the effect of adhesion contracts:
In standardized contracts, such as the instant one, which are made by
parties of unequal bargaining strength, the California courts have
long been disinclined to effectuate the clauses of limitation of liability
which are unclear, unexpected, inconspicuous, or unconscionable.
42
88 One of the provisions of the policy provided for an extension of coverage
to include injuries sustained "while riding in or on a land conveyance provided or
arranged for, directly or indirectly, by such scheduled air carrier . . . for the
transportation of passengers necessitated by an interruption or temporary suspension
of such scheduled air carrier's sevice." The insured was left stranded on one
part of the trip because the carrier's plane was grounded. The agent for the airline,
after unsuccessfully trying to arrange ground transportation, introduced the deceased
to a charter flying service with whom he and two others contracted for a flight to
Chicago. The insured was killed in the crash of the charter flight. The court states
that the crucial issue resolves into whether the limitation to substitute land con-
veyances will prevail over the normal expectation that coverage would extend to
any reasonable form of substitute conveyance. "While the policy specified coverage
for injuries suffered in a land conveyance provided by the scheduled carrier, it
contained no statement whatsoever as to such substituted air conveyance. We do
not see how such verbal vacuity can serve as clear and plain notice to the insured of
noncoverage." Id. at 872, 377 P.2d at 290.
89 There are two methods of defining the risk undertaken. The "named peril"
approach seeks to specify all losses for which protection is given. Anything not
included is by inference intended to be excluded. The policy in Steven was of this
type, and the court in effect said that because they did not also exclude specific
"close" risks, the policy was ambiguous. The other method is to issue an "all risk"
policy and limit the coverage by the terms of the exclusion clause. By this method
all related risks are assumed to be included and the company has the duty of clearly
calling to the insured's attention any "subtraction" from his rights. The courts
attack these policies also on the basis of ambiguity, but here it is ambiguity of the
words used, instead of words not used.
40 Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 877, 377 P.2d
284, 293 (1962). (Italics added.)
41 Id. at 878, 377 P.2d at 294.
42 Id. at 879, 377 P.2d at 295. (Italics added.)
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The court cited Raulet v. Northwestern Etc. Inc. Co.48 and several
other California cases 44 to support this position. In calling attention
to the fact that the policy was only available for examination after
the completion of the purchase, the court in Steven stated that the
disparity in bargaining power was so great that the company had
adopted methods making bargaining impossible.45
Steven provided a nearly perfect illustration of the doctrine
of adhesion contract: It was an insurance case; the sale agent was
a machine; all contract terms except the face amount (and the de-
signation of beneficiary) were determined solely by the company;
circumstances militated against reading the policy after purchase
because of directions to mail it immediately to the beneficiary; the
death was due to a cause clearly outside the intended risk assump-
tion.46 In addition the opinion was written by the only justice who
had used the term Adhesion Contract in a California decision. Why
was the contract wording in Steven twisted and tortured to develop
an ambiguity? Is the term only a convenient label, while the en-
forcement of such a contract remains within the rules of common
law "interpretation"? If so, the social policy underlying adhesion
contracts will not find the same expression that exists within the civil
law. The old "battleground" of ambiguity would have served the
decision without mentioning adhesion contracts, but perhaps these
are the first tentative excursions with a doctrine well established in
the civil law.
47
43 Raulet v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 107 Pac. 292 (1910).
44 Coniglio v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 180 Cal. 596, 182 Pac. 275 (1919);
Sharp v. Scottish Union Co., 136 Cal. 542, 69 Pac. 253 (1902); Brubaker v.
Beneficial etc. Life Ins. Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 340, 270 P. 2d 966 (1955); Glickman
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 16 Cal. 2d 626, 107 P. 2d 252 (1940).
45 Cf. Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555
(1954) also involved a loss after purchase of insurance from a machine. The case
for ambiguity is much stronger, however, because the death was in an excluded
non-scheduled airline, but there was no indication on the machine of this limitation
and the machine was placed in front of a counter used by all the non-scheduled
airlines operating from that airport.
46 As to flying accidents, the company intended to cover a risk involving an
accident to a commercial airliner. At that time, the minimum equipment being
used by the airlines consisted of twin engined metal, full instrumented planes, flown
by a fully rated pilot and co-pilot and generally assisted by an engineer and navi-
gator. The company was held liable for a death in a Piper Tri-Pacer. This airplane'
is a single engined, fabric covered airplane which can only carry four people including
the pilot. It is easily over loaded and is seldom adequately instrumented. While the
pilot in this case may have had the highest rating, he was not required to have
more than a mere commercial license by applicable Federal regulations.
47 In Walnut Creek Pipe Dist., Inc. v. Gates Rubber Co., Inc., 228 A.C.A.
929, 39 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1964), the only decision since Steven using the term, the
plaintiff wholesaler attempted to bolster his case for an implied term of his contract
with the defendant manufacturer, by calling it an adhesion contract. The court
rejected the contention stating, "There is no evidence that the parties in the instant
case were not bargaining as equals. . . ." at 934, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
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CONCLUSION
One conclusion to be derived from the cases is that the only
value of the term Adhesion Contract is to raise a series of "well
established rules" of construction applicable to insurance con-
tracts.48 But a well recognized doctrine of Adhesion Contract would
give the courts a framework within which to relieve the harshness
of common law contract rules operating on standardized mass forms
created by parties in vastly superior bargaining positions. A rea-
sonable measure of certainty could still be achieved if the limits of
the use of adhesion contract theory were clearly defined. The in-
surance cases provide the best opportunity to develop and delineate
these limits. Such a doctrine will not emerge, be defined, and
limited until the courts direct their attention to the task and stop
torturing traditional rules out of recognition. The argument that
such an approach is contrary to settled principles of contract law is
generally accepted by courts, but ". . . the majority still allows re-
covery by the back door, so to speak. They regard recovery ex con-
tractu as impossible, but at the same time allow recovery ex de-
lictu."4 9 Under the guise of tort, the courts are making new law with
regard to the formation of insurance contracts. 0
.. . [Tiechnical doctrines of the law of contracts cannot possibly
provide the courts with the right answers. . . . (Those) resorted to
by the courts in the insurance cases denying liability are in the last
analysis but rationalizations of the court's emotional desire to pre-
serve freedom of contract. 51
It would seem that a more carefully tailored system of contract
law would evolve from the frank recognition of the doctrine of
Adhesion Contract, followed by a more accurate definition from con-
tract case decisions. In the absence of such recognition, the con-
tinued infusion of tort "rules" into contract cases can only re-
sult in greater uncertainty and capriciousness in the enforcement
of these inter-party legal relations.
Allen Reames
48 Maxon v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 214 Cal. App. 2d 603,
29 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963), lists five such rules as collected from the past authoritative
cases at page 611, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 590. See particularly Continental Casualty Co.
v. Phoenix Const. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956).
49 Kessler, supra note 10, at 635.
50 Duffie v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913).
51 Kesler, supra note 10, at 639. (Italics added.)
